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OUTFOXING ALASKA HUNTERS: HOW
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CHANGING REGULATORY
INTERPRETATIONS CAN MORE
EFFICIENTLY POLICE AGENCY
DISCRETION
BRIAN J. SHEARER∗
The Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc. undermined the controversial Alaska Hunters doctrine by stating that
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) treats initial and subsequent agency
actions in the same way. Applied to rulemaking, Fox would have the APA
treat initial regulatory interpretations and subsequent revisions of those
interpretations in the same way, in direct conflict with the Alaska Hunters
doctrine’s requirement of notice and comment for certain revisions.
At the same time that the Supreme Court undermined this restriction on
agency discretion, the Court provided a possible replacement: substantive
arbitrary and capricious review that can be applied to interpretive rulemaking.
Using the arbitrary and capricious review in Fox, which requires (1) an
explanation of why the agency changed, (2) a justification of why factors used
in the previous interpretation were disregarded, and (3) an analysis on how
reliance interests were considered, courts could police agency interpretive
discretion by conducting a reasoned analysis of adjustments to regulatory
interpretations.
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INTRODUCTION
Every so often, an individual can change the course of American
history with a speech. Some of history’s most revered Americans
inspired the country into action through sheer oratory mastery,
ushering in historic reforms with mere words. Other times, a speech
incites reform a little less directly: “Have you ever tried to get cow
s*** out of a Prada purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.”1 Nicole
Richie’s comments at the 2003 Billboard Music Awards started a
chain of events ending in the Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc.,2 which might finally provide a sufficient
framework for analyzing how government agencies can change
policy. Sometimes, reform is accidental.
The Administrative Procedure Act3 (APA) provides the default
standards and procedures used by agencies to implement statutes.4 It

1. Billboard Music Awards (FOX television broadcast Dec. 10, 2003).
2. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
3. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
4. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96 n.4 (2003) (providing sources that explain
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also establishes judicial review of agency action in order to restrain
agency discretion and legitimize an otherwise constitutionally
dubious “fourth branch” of government.5 In reviewing agency action,
courts most often use the arbitrary and capricious standard,6 a
standard that courts have interpreted and reinterpreted in often
contradictory and confusing ways.7 This confusion has almost
certainly encouraged the litigious nature of the modern
administrative state.8 The confusion has also led to diverging U.S.
courts of appeals’ interpretations of administrative law doctrines,
forcing agencies to choose between uniform administration of
statutes and obedience to differing regional judicial doctrines.9
Additionally, ossification of rulemaking procedures further
obstructs efficient administrative governance. First used by Professor
E. Donald Elliott in 1990,10 “ossification” has become a common topic
in the study of administrative law.11 The theory contends that
the well-known legal evolution toward an administrative state that implements laws
through agencies and not the judiciary).
5. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1727 (2011) (arguing that judicial review keeps the delegation
of legislative and executive powers in check).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (setting forth that courts should overturn agency
actions meeting this standard).
7. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 499, 526–34 (2011) (asserting that there are agency-specific precedents
regarding arbitrary and capricious analysis). Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (suggesting that arbitrary
and capricious review is “evasive,” but that the standard requires an articulated and
rational decisionmaking process), with Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that arbitrary and capricious review must be
“searching” but not a substitute of agency judgment). For example, the Supreme
Court has held that it “will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s
path may reasonably be discerned,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974), but that courts may not provide a reasoned basis for
an agency action if the agency did not provide one, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
8. See Meazell, supra note 5, at 1743–69 (studying “serial cases” that continually
cycle from agencies to the courts).
9. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 124–25 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY], available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf (finding
that uncertainty in agency treatment of statutes is one of the most “intolerable”
consequences of circuit conflicts in general).
10. According to Professor McGarity, Professor Elliot first referred to
“ossification” in this context in a 1990 symposium at Duke Law School. See Thomas
O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385,
1385–86 (1992) (citing E. Donald Elliot, Remarks at the Duke University School of
Law Symposium: Assessing the Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty
Years: Law, Politics, and Economics (Nov. 15, 1990)).
11. For a discussion and critique of the trend of ossification, see David L.
Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE
L.J. 276, 284 (2010), which discusses ossification but takes no position on it;
McGarity, supra note 10, at 1386, which states that rulemaking requires so many
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rulemaking has become increasingly burdensome for agencies due to
congressionally-imposed and judicially-fabricated procedures.12 The
term analogizes the incremental increase of bureaucracy to the cellby-cell growth of bone tissue.13 Ossifying procedures include impact
analyses14 and substantive requirements for agencies to address all
Though each procedure and
contingencies and comments.15
requirement has value by itself, most scholars agree that the general
trend is leading towards an excessively bureaucratic system.16 More
costly and timely procedures make rulemaking more inefficient and
rigid, encouraging agencies to avoid traditional policy-making
strategies, like notice-and-comment rulemaking, and to favor less
transparent policy-making tools, such as guidance documents or caseby-case adjudication.17
procedures, analyses, and reviews that case-by-case adjudication may be superior; and
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
60, 71 (1995), which lays out the problem of ossification and suggests remedies. For
rebuttals to the critiques of ossification, see William S. Jordan, III, Ossification
Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To
Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 397
(2000), which argues that hard-look review, a commonly cited form of ossification,
does not significantly impede agencies; and Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A
Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 307
(2009), which contends that judicial review, and ossification in general, may be
necessary to limit agency discretion.
12. See Franklin, supra note 11, at 283–84 (holding Congress, the President, and
the courts responsible for making the rulemaking process “increasingly
cumbersome”).
13. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1247 (5th ed.
2011) (defining ossification as “[t]he natural process of bone formation”).
14. Various statutes require impact analyses. E.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act
§ 3(a), 5 U.S.C. §§ 603, 605(b) (2006) (requiring agencies to publish a regulatory
flexibility analysis, and convene a panel of small business representatives, where a
regulation would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (mandating an environmental impact analysis report for each
regulation affecting the environment); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 § 2, 44
U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1) (establishing that the Office of Management and Budget must
analyze and approve any rule that would impose an information collection burden
on ten or more persons).
15. See Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(holding that the intention of a basis and purpose statement is to respond to
comments received and not just to address general policy issues); Auto. Parts
& Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[T]he ‘concise
general statement of . . . basis and purpose’ mandated by Section 4 will enable us to
see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why
the agency reacted to them as it did.”).
16. See sources cited supra notes 10–11 (providing scholarship supporting and
criticizing the ossification theory).
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 9 (2000) (“[A]gencies have sometimes
improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory
notice-and-comment requirements for agency rulemaking . . . .”); Todd D. Rakoff,
The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 159, 166 (2000) (arguing that agencies avoid ossification by issuing guidance
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The Alaska Hunters doctrine18 is one controversial example of an
ossifying procedure. The doctrine, which the federal courts of
appeals have not universally adopted,19 establishes that agencies can
alter certain interpretations of regulations only through notice-andcomment procedures.20
According to the doctrine, if an
interpretation that is initially published without notice and comment
becomes definitive and engenders reliance, an agency may only
amend
that
interpretation
through
notice-and-comment
procedures.21 The doctrine is in conflict with the APA, which
expressly exempts all interpretive rules from notice-and-comment
requirements.22
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court overruled the
Alaska Hunters doctrine sub silentio in Fox, that the Court provided an
analysis that is more consistent with the plain language and Supreme
Court interpretations of the APA than the Alaska Hunters doctrine,
and that the Fox Court’s arbitrary and capricious review is a less
burdensome model for policing interpretive agency rulemaking. Part
I briefly discusses agency rulemaking and the changing distinction
between interpretive and legislative rules; Part I also outlines the
current state of the Alaska Hunters doctrine and unravels the
interwoven opinions in Fox. Part II asserts that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fox overruled the infamous Alaska Hunters doctrine sub
silentio by holding that the APA does not distinguish between initial
and subsequent agency actions. Part III argues that the arbitrary and
capricious review in Fox—requiring an agency to explain why it
changed policy, why it disregarded contradicting facts or factors, and
how it considered reliance interests—should be applied to
interpretive rulemaking. Part III continues by arguing that the
arbitrary and capricious analysis in Fox is a method for restricting
agency interpretive rulemaking authority that is more consistent with
documents). But see Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of
Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 820–23 (2010) (providing an empirical study
that suggests that agencies do not use guidance documents to avoid notice-andcomment rulemaking).
18. See Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A Defense of
Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 156 (2001) (coining the term
“Alaska Hunters doctrine” in reference to the holding in Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n
v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and its progeny).
19. See United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th Cir.
2010) (recognizing the circuit split); see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 9, at
124–25 (discussing the problems of circuit splits in administrative law).
20. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034.
21. Id. at 1034–35; see Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 950
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (clarifying that reliance interests are necessary to challenge an
interpretation using the Alaska Hunters doctrine).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006).
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Supreme Court case law and the APA, and is more effective at
limiting agency discretion than the Alaska Hunters doctrine.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The APA and Judicial Review of Agency Rules
The APA establishes default standards for judicial review of both
the substance and procedure of agency rulemaking.23 Typically, a
court can overturn an agency rule if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or if the
process for issuing the rule was invalid.24 Thus, courts both review
the substance of a rule and ensure that the agency used the proper
procedure to issue the rule.
Due to the onerous requirements of formal rulemaking,25 Congress
allows most agencies to issue rules through the informal notice-andcomment procedure.26 Notice-and-comment procedures require
agencies to publish notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register.27 The public then has a brief opportunity to provide
comments either supporting or opposing the proposed rulemaking.28
Agencies are required to address the comments in the final
publication of the rule in the Federal Register.29
Section 553(b)(A) explicitly exempts interpretive rules and general
statements of policy from notice-and-comment procedures.30 The
language of § 553(b)(A) has led to extensive litigation over what
constitutes a legislative or substantive rule—requiring notice and
comment—and what constitutes an interpretive rule or general
statement of policy—requiring no specified APA procedures at all.31
23. Id. §§ 551–559.
24. Id. § 706; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)
(explaining that arbitrary and capricious review and procedural review are the main
sources of judicial review outside of the typical jurisdictions of constitutional and
statutory review).
25. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (requiring hearings comparable to adjudication).
26. See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973)
(holding that Congress intended formal rulemaking procedures to apply only to
rulemakings that are required to be “on the record”); see also Franklin, supra note 11,
at 282 (stating that Congress rarely requires rulemakings to be “on the record”).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
28. Id. § 553(c).
29. Id.; see also La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075,
1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (calling for agencies to respond to comments that, if true,
would require a change in the proposed rule).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
31. See Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596–97
(5th Cir. 1995) (arguing that the key inquiry to determining if a rule is legislative is
whether it establishes a binding norm); Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098
(9th Cir. 1983) (stating that substantive rules affect an existing law or policy while
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In theory, a rule is legislative if it creates a new binding norm, and a
rule is interpretive if it merely clarifies an already established binding
norm in a regulation or statute.32 In practice, however, agencies can
use interpretive rules to change agency policy.33
Even when an agency uses proper procedure, a court can still
overturn agency rules that the court determines to be arbitrary and
capricious.34 Given the dictionary definitions of “arbitrary”35 and
“capricious,”36 one would suspect that agency rules are rarely
overturned. Courts, however, have overruled agency rules and orders
of all types using a strict form of arbitrary and capricious review
known as the hard-look test.37 Taking a “hard look,” courts can
interpretive rules only clarify existing law or regulations); see also William R.
Andersen, Informal Agency Advice—Graphing the Critical Analysis, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 595,
605–09 (2002) (providing an analysis of the differences between interpretive and
legislative rules). Interpretive rules and general statements of policy are typically
referred to together as “non legislative rules.” See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 11, at 286
(explaining that the term aims to distinguish interpretive rules and policy statements
from legislative rules).
32. See Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care, 56 F.3d at 596–600 (analyzing
whether a rule created a binding norm by looking to the language of the rule and
the manner in which it was implemented).
33. E.g., 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: AN FTC
STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 8–12 (2011) (acknowledging five
“significant” adjustments to previous interpretations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
that could be considered policy changes: the Department of Motor Vehicles is no
longer considered a “consumer reporting agency,” a report from a consumer
reporting agency is now a “consumer report” even if it is used for commercial
purposes, the analytical “joint user” concept is no longer endorsed by the FTC,
anonymous consumer information that can be linked to consumers are now
consumer reports, and consumer reporting agencies may disclose a P.O. box instead
of an office address); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1705, 1711–12 & nn.42–45 (2007) (citing to scholarship indicating that some
interpretations can be binding insofar as the interpretation is of a binding rule).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
35. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 13,
at 91 (“Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or
principle.”).
36. See id. at 277 (“Characterized by, arising from, or subject to caprice; impulsive
and unpredictable.”).
37. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374–78 (1989) (applying
the hard look test to the Court’s arbitrary and capricious review of agency action
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (using a strict form of review,
although not using the phrase “hard look”). The Supreme Court never actually used
the term “hard look” in State Farm, but commentators have suggested that State Farm
endorsed the doctrine. See, e.g., JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
RULEMAKING 481 (5th ed. 2012) (reporting that the Supreme Court has never used
the phrase outside of NEPA cases). Before Marsh and State Farm, “hard look”
referred to how hard an agency must look when making policy, not how hard the court
looks in determining whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously. See
Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 527–30 (1997) (providing a historical overview
of the judiciary’s application of the hard-look test to explain the court’s role in
migrating the hard-look test from applying to the agency to applying to the court).
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reverse agency actions, including rules, if (1) an agency relied on
facts that Congress did not intend for the agency to consider, (2) an
agency failed to consider important aspects of the issue, (3) evidence
raised before the agency contradicts the agency’s explanation for its
decision, or (4) the explanation is so implausible that it cannot be
ascribed to a difference of perspective.38
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,39 the Court concluded that a court may not impose
procedures on an agency unless specifically required in the APA or
other governing statutes.40 This doctrine has limited judicial review
of rulemaking—other than statutory and constitutional review—to
substantive arbitrary and capricious review, and review of procedures
that the APA mandates, namely, notice and comment.41
B. Binding Legislative Rules, Interpretive Rules, and the Deference Granted
to Agencies
Courts have struggled with the distinction between legislative and
interpretive rules for decades, but courts and commentators generally
agree that a rule is legislative and must be issued through notice and
comment if it is “binding” or has independent legal effect.42
Recently, courts have characterized the distinction between legislative
and interpretive rules as whether a rule establishes new law or is
properly interpretive.43 However, this characterization is only a rearticulation of the inquiry of whether a rule is independently
binding. A legislative rule is still defined as a rule that establishes
“binding” norms and a rule interpreting its underlying regulation

38. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
39. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
40. Id. at 545–48.
41. See Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 344–45 (2011) (stating that the current legal
landscape focuses on what constitutes a legislative rule that is subject to notice and
comment and arguing that substantive review should be the focus).
42. See Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[A] rule with the force
and effect of law—binding not only the agency and regulated parties, but also the
courts—is by definition a substantive rule.”); see also sources cited supra note 31
(providing cases and articles that focus on the “binding” nature of a rule in
determining whether it is legislative or interpretive).
43. See Sprint Corp. v. FCC, 315 F.3d 369, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (specifying that a
clarification of a definition capturing the original intent of the rule is an interpretive
rule); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169–70 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a regulatory interpretation that is not sufficiently interpretive, in that it
independently establishes new law, is not a valid interpretive rule).
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would not be independently binding.44 Thus, the difficulty still lies in
determining which rules are independently binding.45
The definitional confusion over interpretive and legislative rules
has been encouraged by the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in the
matter. For example, in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,46 the
Court held that an interpretive rule is invalid if it is inconsistent with
the legislative rule it interprets, limiting its guidance on validity of
interpretive rules to the most blatant circumstance—where a
regulation and its interpretation conflict.47
Additionally, in the related context of judicial deference to agency
interpretations, the Court recently began linking the deference
granted with the procedure used to issue an interpretation. In United
States v. Mead Corp.48 and Christensen v. Harris County,49 the Court ruled
that courts should typically grant Skidmore deference50 to rules that
are not issued through notice and comment.51 Skidmore deference
requires that courts grant a small amount of deference to agency
interpretations, proportionate to the interpretation’s power to
persuade, because of agency expertise.52 Compared to the deference
established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc.,53 which requires deference to reasonable agency interpretations
when a statute is ambiguous,54 Skidmore is a less deferential standard.55
By establishing that courts only grant Skidmore deference, and not
44. See Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 169–70 (stating that an interpretive rule is only binding
where the binding element is derived from a process that is “reasonably described as
interpretation”).
45. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (declaring that an interpretive rule has “legal effect,” a synonym for
binding effect, if in the absence of the interpretation there would be no basis for
enforcing the legislative rule in accordance with that interpretation).
46. 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
47. Id. at 100.
48. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
49. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
50. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.”).
51. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–29 (ruling that tariff classifications were entitled to
Skidmore deference); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (holding that interpretations that do
not have the force of law, and that were not issued through formal adjudication or
notice and comment, do not warrant Chevron deference).
52. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
53. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. See id. at 842–43 (establishing that a court will look first to the plain language
of a statute, and if ambiguous, will then give deference to an agency interpretation).
55. See generally Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105 (2001) (analyzing the “weak”
Skidmore deference and the stronger Chevron deference).
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Chevron deference, to rules not issued through notice and comment,
the Court began a trend of choosing the degree of deference based
on the procedure the agency used to pass the rule.56 The court
determines how much deference to grant to a rule by looking to the
procedure the agency used to issue the rule, and a court is less
deferential to an agency’s rule that is issued without notice and
comment than to a rule that is issued through notice and comment.57
The Supreme Court expounded on this doctrine in Barnhart v.
Walton.58 In Walton, the Court stated that courts should rely heavily
on the methods of interpretation that the agency employs and the
substance of the question under consideration when determining
whether to give Chevron deference.59 The Court essentially stated that
Skidmore deference is not granted per se to rules issued without notice
and comment, and that Chevron deference could be applied to
interpretive rules issued without notice and comment where the
agency thoroughly analyzed the issue.60
Walton could lead one to believe that courts have begun adopting
the approach of linking whether a rule is binding, and thus
legislative, to procedure.61 For years, scholars have been proposing
this approach, arguing that instead of determining whether a rule is
legislative based on whether it is binding, a rule should simply be
legislative and binding if it was issued through notice and comment,
and interpretive but not binding if issued without notice and
comment.62 The Walton Court’s movement towards using procedure
56. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–29 (conditioning the deference owed in part on the
procedure the agency used).
57. See id. (looking to whether a rule was issued through notice and comment to
determine the appropriate degree of deference, and finding that the customs rule at
issue failed to qualify for Chevron deference because Congress had not delegated
authority to the Agency to make rules carrying the force of law); Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (basing the deference determination on the
time and effort spent during the rulemaking procedure and concluding that an
interpretation contained in an opinion letter warranted Skidmore deference, but not
Chevron deference).
58. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
59. Id. at 222.
60. See id. (holding that Chevron deference should be granted to an interpretative
rule because of the presence of a statutory gap, the importance of the issue, the
expertise of the agency, the complexity of the issue, and the careful consideration
that the agency gave the question).
61. It is a general consensus among legal scholars that the courts have not
adopted this new approach. E.g., Franklin, supra note 11, at 279. This Comment
contends that the Supreme Court has been taking steps toward adopting the
approach, and may already be applying it without fully explaining why. At least one
scholar agrees. See Gersen, supra note 33, at 1720–21 (arguing that Mead implicitly
embraced this approach).
62. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490–91
(1992) (introducing the concept of linking a rule’s binding effect on the court to the

SHEARER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

OUTFOXING ALASKA HUNTERS

10/23/2012 1:00 PM

177

to determine deference bears a striking resemblance to the scholarly
proposal of using procedure to determine binding effect.
Professor David Franklin has criticized the approach of tying
procedure to binding effect, referring to it as the “short cut.”63 The
short cut focuses more on the legal effect of an agency’s rule in court
than the legal effect of a rule on the public.64 The obvious pitfall to
the short cut is that agencies can label a rule interpretive and
circumvent notice and comment, while enforcing the interpretation
on the public as if it were binding.65 The public could always appeal
the application of a particular interpretation in court at a later date,
but appeals of interpretations are rare and costly.66 Proponents of
the short cut argue that it will require all rules to undergo scrutiny,
either during the notice-and-comment process or upon appeal.67
In Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,68 the Supreme Court
moved towards adopting the short cut. The Court addressed whether
a regulation the agency labeled “interpretive” should be considered
legally binding in court.69 The Court concluded that because the
“interpretation” affected individual rights and obligations, and
because the agency issued it using notice-and-comment procedures, it
should be considered binding in court.70 By concluding that
regulations issued through notice and comment are more likely to be
binding in court, the Court moved closer to adopting the short cut.
Further confusion arises out of the continued use of the deference
established in Auer v. Robbins71 after Mead.72 Auer deference—given to
procedure used to issue the rule); Gersen, supra note 33, at 1719 (re-exploring the
theory that rules should only be binding if issued using notice and comment through
the lens of Hoctor).
63. Franklin, supra note 11, at 279.
64. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 354–56 (calling this approach “ex post
monitoring”).
65. See Franklin, supra note 11, at 308–12 (espousing the hazards of the short
cut).
66. See id. at 310 (explaining that “[d]octrines such as standing, finality, ripeness,
and nonreviewability of agency inaction combine to make it very difficult to obtain
judicial review of . . . agency pronouncements”).
67. See Elliott, supra note 62, at 1491 (arguing that the traditional and short-cut
approaches have roughly equal opportunities for public scrutiny).
68. 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
69. Id. at 171–72.
70. Id. at 172–74.
71. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). In Auer, sergeants and a lieutenant in the St. Louis
Police Department challenged the application of the Department of Labor’s
regulation establishing a “salary-basis test,” which indicates that an employee is
exempt from overtime pay protections in the Fair Labor Standards Act if the
employee receives pay on a salary basis. Id. at 455. The Secretary of Labor submitted
an amicus brief interpreting its “salary-basis test” as applying to the employees in
question. Id. at 461–62. The Court followed the interpretation of the Department of
Labor’s regulation in the Secretary’s brief, and in the process granted the
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agencies’ interpretations of their own rules—is the strongest
deference that courts grant to agencies.73 Auer deference deems an
agency’s interpretation of its regulations to be “controlling unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”74 Application
of this degree of deference seemingly contradicts Mead, which held
that courts typically grant the lesser Skidmore deference to rules that
are not issued through notice and comment.75 The Supreme Court
reconciled Mead and Auer in Gonzales v. Oregon,76 granting Skidmore
deference to the regulatory interpretation in that case.77 The Court
distinguished Auer from Gonzales because the interpreted regulation
in Auer “gave specificity to a statutory scheme,” while the regulation
in Gonzales was nearly identical to the statute.78 Thus, the Court
grants a high degree of deference to interpretations of specific
regulations, and less deference to interpretations of vague
regulations or regulations that merely repeat the statute.79
By making courts’ deference dependent on the procedure that
agencies utilize in issuing the interpretation, courts have begun to
assign legal effect based on procedure. Assigning legal effect based
on procedure may overlap with determining whether a rule is
legislative because deference level and binding legal force are
similar.80
interpretation significant deference because it was not “clearly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” Id.
72. E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (recognizing Auer
deference after Mead).
73. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1142 tbl.15 (2008) (presenting a study indicating that courts uphold
an interpretation under Auer deference 91% of the time, while only upholding
agency action around 70% of the time under all other levels of deference).
74. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–29 (2001).
76. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
77. See id. at 255–57 (specifying that Auer deference is granted to interpretations
of legislative rules promulgated under congressional authority to issue rules “carrying
the force of law,” while all other interpretations receive Skidmore deference).
78. See id. at 256–57. The statute in question, the Controlled Substances Act,
allowed prescription drugs for “currently accepted medical use,” requiring a “valid
prescription” that is issued for a “legitimate medical purpose.” Id.; see 21 U.S.C.
§§ 812(b), 829(c), 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006). The regulatory language being
interpreted included similar phrasing: “legitimate medical purpose” and “course of
professional practice.” 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2011).
79. Compare Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256–58 (providing weaker Skidmore deference to
the interpretation because the underlying regulation merely restated the terms of
the statute itself), with Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (providing stronger Auer deference to
the interpretation because the underlying regulation instituted a “salary-basis test”
the Court considered a “creature of the Secretary’s own regulations,” implementing
the underlying Fair Labor Standards Act).
80. Courts have even articulated degree of deference as whether an
interpretation is binding on the court. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
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C. Procedural Ossification Under the Alaska Hunters Doctrine
While the Supreme Court was blurring the line between deference
and the binding nature of agency rules, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit was imposing additional procedural
requirements on agency rulemaking.
Since Vermont Yankee,
procedural ossification of agency rulemaking has taken the form of
requiring notice and comment where the APA does not explicitly
require it by narrowly defining an exception81 or imposing additional
requirements in the notice-and-comment process.82 One of the most
controversial of these judicial constructions is the Alaska Hunters
doctrine.83
In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.84 and Alaska
Professional Hunters Ass’n v. FAA,85 the D.C. Circuit held that an agency
can only adjust certain interpretive rules of regulations after notice
and comment.86 Citing dicta in Paralyzed Veterans,87 the court in
551 U.S. 158, 172–74 (2007) (using the fact that the interpretation was issued
through notice and comment as a factor in determining if it was binding in court);
Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238–39 (2004) (“[I]n
determining whether Regulation Z’s interpretation of TILA’s text is binding on the
courts, [the Court uses Chevron deference].” (emphasis added)).
Court
determinations on whether an interpretation needed to be issued through notice
and comment are based on whether the rule is binding on the public; and whether a
rule is binding on the public is affected by the level of deference allotted to the
interpretation.
81. See, e.g., Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(rejecting the government’s argument that the regulation at issue could be
exempted from notice and comment under the agency management or personnel
exception); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 276 F.3d 634, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(concluding that notice and comment is required where there was a substantive
value judgment for a procedural rule); infra notes 85–92 and accompanying text
(discussing the Alaska Hunters doctrine).
82. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative
Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 536–37 (2000) (compiling additional noticeand-comment procedures).
83. See Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second Opinion? Inconsistent
Interpretive Rules, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2000, at 16, 16–17 (arguing that the
Alaska Hunters doctrine disrespects the interpretive rule exemption in § 553(b)(A));
William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1329–30 (2001)
(stating that the Alaska Hunters holding is “difficult to justify”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 566–74
(2000) (asserting that the Alaska Hunters doctrine was a mistake); Peter L. Strauss,
Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential
Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 846–47 (2001) (calling the Alaska Hunters doctrine an
“unsustainable formality”); Connolly, supra note 18, at 157 (contending that the
Alaska Hunters doctrine makes interpretive rulemaking inflexible, thereby deterring
agencies from issuing interpretations).
84. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
85. 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
86. See id. at 1034 (holding that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) could
only deviate from the interpretive advice its local officials had given for over thirty
years by issuing a rule through notice and comment); Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at
586 (holding that the Agency’s interpretation of its own regulation did not require
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Alaska Hunters held that “[w]hen an agency has given its regulation a
definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that
interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, something
it may not accomplish without notice and comment.”88
In Alaska Hunters, the D.C. Circuit addressed a case where the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had changed its
interpretation of the applicability of a pilot licensing regulation.89
Local FAA officials had consistently informed hunting guides in
Alaska that they could fly planes into hunting territory without
obtaining a pilot license.90 Years later, after the Alaskan hunting
industry had relied on this interpretation, the FAA changed its
interpretation without notice and comment, requiring hunting
guides to obtain pilot licenses.91 The D.C. Circuit ruled that the FAA
could not change the longstanding and definitive interpretation that
hunting guides did not need pilot licenses without issuing a new
interpretation through notice and comment, even though the first
interpretation was not issued through notice and comment.92
To substantiate its holding, the D.C. Circuit cited relatively little
authority.93 The court held that changing a definitive interpretation
of a regulation is a constructive amendment to the rule itself, which
requires notice and comment.94 The court also focused on the fact
that Alaskan hunting operations had relied on local FAA officials’
regular advice in deciding to open up businesses in the area, and
thus, that advice had become authoritative administrative common
law.95 The court reasoned that its holding was justified by the need to

notice and comment because the interpretation was not sufficiently distinct or
additive to the regulation).
87. See Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586 (“Once an agency gives its regulation an
interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally modify the
regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking.”).
88. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1033–34 (citing Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127
F.3d 90, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586)).
89. Id. at 1031–33.
90. Id. at 1031–32.
91. Id. at 1032.
92. Id. at 1034–35. Not only had the first interpretation never been issued
through notice and comment, it had never been documented in writing. Id. at 1031–
32. The initial interpretation was simply an understanding between local FAA
officials and the hunting industry. Id.
93. See id. at 1033–34 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006)); Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94–95;
Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586.
94. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034.
95. Id. at 1035.
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limit an agency’s ability to unfairly change the rules of the game
when a company had relied on those rules.96
The D.C. Circuit has since significantly limited the Alaska Hunters
doctrine. First, only a party who substantially and justifiably relied
upon a previous interpretation can challenge an improperly issued
adjustment to a regulatory interpretation.97 The reliance inquiry
looks to whether the agency was bound by the interpretation and
whether there was actual reliance.98
Second, the previous
interpretation must be definitive and longstanding.99 The Alaska
Hunters doctrine has since been cited with approval in some
circuits,100 while other circuits have rejected101 or explicitly avoided
it.102
96. See id. (“Those regulated by an administrative agency are entitled to ‘know
the rules by which the game will be played.’” (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Holdsworth’s English Law, 25 LAW Q. REV. 412, 414 (1909))).
97. See MetWest Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(distinguishing the high level of reliance in Alaska Hunters from the low level of
reliance in the case at issue); Devon Energy Corp. v. Kempthorne, 551 F.3d 1030,
1040–41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that reliance on guidance documents was not
enough to bind an agency when the guidance documents never had the force of
law); Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 198 F.3d 944, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(finding that the plaintiff did not substantially rely on the Agency’s initial
interpretation and that the Agency had not developed a final policy).
98. See, e.g., Devon Energy, 551 F.3d at 1040–41 (explaining that memoranda
issued by low-level officials did not bind the Agency, and thus could not be justifiably
relied upon).
99. See Commodity Carriers, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 434 F.3d
604, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that an interpretation is not definitive if the agency
contradicts the interpretation); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 57–58
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding that a definitive interpretation must be explicit).
100. See SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 498 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting Paralyzed
Veterans outright); Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 682
(6th Cir. 2005) (supporting the Alaska Hunters doctrine in dicta only); Shell Offshore
Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 629–30 (5th Cir. 2001) (invalidating an interpretation
of a regulation that contradicted a “long established and consistent practice” without
notice and comment).
101. See Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling
that agencies always have the authority to change regulatory interpretations if both
the initial and subsequent rules constitute interpretive rules); Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d
1168, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (focusing only on whether a rule was interpretive or
substantive and not requiring notice and comment for a change to a longstanding
policy); see also Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 81–82 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding, prior
to Alaska Hunters, that changes to a regulatory interpretation did not need notice and
comment).
102. See United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1140–41 (10th
Cir. 2010) (declining to rule on whether to adopt Alaska Hunters because it was
inapplicable in a case involving an initial interpretation that was not determinative);
Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2009) (refusing to rule on
whether the Alaska Hunters doctrine was valid because the plaintiff’s argument did
not satisfy the requirements of an Alaska Hunters argument); Paragon Health
Network, Inc. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 1141, 1148 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
court need not address Alaska Hunters because it ruled that the initial and
subsequent interpretations were actually consistent).
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D. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
In Fox, the Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) decision to forbid the broadcast of fleeting
expletives.103 The Court avoided any constitutional free speech
implications104 and instead reviewed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit’s holding that the FCC’s policy change was arbitrary
and capricious.105 The FCC had changed its policy from allowing
isolated expletives to a policy of considering the frequency of
expletives as one factor in determining a broadcast’s legality.106 The
Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the change was not arbitrary and
capricious.107 Though the Fox holding has been described as further
limiting judicial intervention in agency policy changes,108 it is not
entirely clear which assertions in Fox carried the support of five
Justices.
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion; Justices Thomas, Roberts,
and Alito joined, while Justice Kennedy joined in part.109 Justice
Scalia wrote that the APA does not distinguish original agency action
from later action altering that policy.110 Justice Scalia provided a
summary of his approach to arbitrary and capricious review of policy
changes:
[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation
for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that
it is changing position . . . . And of course the agency must show
that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not
demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new
103. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 505 (2009).
104. Id. at 529. The Supreme Court remanded the First Amendment issue back to
the Second Circuit because the lower court had not definitively ruled on the
constitutionality of the indecency policy. Id. at 530. On remand, the Second Circuit
ruled that the indecency policy violated the First Amendment. Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010). However, this ruling was
recently vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, which instead ruled that the
indecency standard was void for vagueness. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132
S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012), remanded sub nom. to ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 475 F. App’x 796 (2d
Cir. 2012).
105. Fox, 556 U.S. at 516.
106. Id. at 512.
107. Id. at 530.
108. See Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65
U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 573 (2011) (arguing that Fox heightened the ability for new
administrations to change policy and deemphasized the importance of regulatory
regularity).
109. Fox, 556 U.S. at 504. Justice Kennedy did not join Part III-E of Justice Scalia’s
decision, which is the section that refutes the dissents. Id. at 523–29.
110. Id. at 515.
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policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the
new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates.111

However, Justice Scalia also wrote that agencies must provide a
reasoned explanation if the change in policy contradicts factual
findings used to make the previous policy, or if the prior policy has
engendered serious reliance interests.112
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.113 The dissent’s approach is similar to
the majority’s approach, but has been differentiated as requiring a
comparison between the old and new policies.114 However, Justice
Breyer’s analysis does not always require a comparison. Justice Breyer
explains that “change is sometimes (not always) a relevant background
feature that sometimes (not always) requires focus (upon prior
justifications) and explanation lest the adoption of the new policy (in
that circumstance) be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion.’”115 In fact, Justice Breyer explicitly states that a new
justification need not be better than the previous policy.116 Justice
Breyer’s analysis parallels Justice Scalia’s in stating that agencies
should consider the major factors used to adopt the old policy when
changing it.117 However, Justice Breyer argues that agencies cannot
base a policy change solely on unchanged facts or factors known at
the time the original policy was made.118 This last point is the
principal difference between Justice Scalia’s and Justice Breyer’s
opinions.119
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence travels the blurry line between the
majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent. As Justice Breyer
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 546–67 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. See Levin, supra note 108, at 568 (stating that Justice Breyer’s dissent
necessitated a “direct comparison” between policies).
115. Fox, 556 U.S. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Compare id. at 550 (arguing that an agency should have to explain why it now
rejects the considerations that led it to adopt the prior policy), with id. at 515
(majority opinion) (holding that a more reasoned explanation is required when, for
example, an agency bases a new policy on factual findings that contradict those on
which the prior policy was based).
118. Id. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. Compare id. (“[The Agency’s] explanation instead discussed several factors
well known to it the first time around, which by themselves provide no significant
justification for a change of policy.”), with id. at 515 (majority opinion) (stating that
the Agency must provide further explanations for policies that conflict with prior
findings, but not going so far as saying that an agency cannot ever base a policy
change solely on factors considered during the initial policymaking process).
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recognized in his dissent, Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Breyer’s
assertions should be precedent where Justice Kennedy deviates from
Justice Scalia and sides with Justice Breyer.120 Justice Kennedy
explicitly “agree[d] with the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer that
the agency must explain why ‘it now reject[s] the considerations that
led it to adopt that initial policy.’”121
Justice Kennedy also
acknowledged that reliance interests should be considered in the
analysis.122 Like both Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy does not require an agency’s new policy to be “better,” but
instead requires that a policy alteration be rational, neutral, and
within the agency’s authority.123
Justices Scalia, Breyer, and Kennedy largely agree on the standard
used to determine if an agency’s policy change is arbitrary and
capricious.124 Because Justice Kennedy asserts that an agency must
explain why it rejected prior considerations, the Fox Court does in
fact require an agency to explain “why” it changed policy.125 In
explaining why, agencies should address or discount factual findings
and other factors used in the original policy, as well as reliance
interests created by the prior policy.126 Additionally, all Justices agree
that this analysis is not based on any heightened standard due to the
fact that the agency is changing a policy,127 but is instead a result of
the general requirement that agencies cannot ignore facts or factors,
whether they are new or were relied upon in prior policies.128 Thus,

120. See id. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s holding could in this
respect significantly change judicial review in practice, and not in a healthy direction.
But see, ante, at 535–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).”). Justice Kennedy’s decision is integral to understanding the precedent
established in Fox because Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by five Justices
including Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer’s opinion was joined by four Justices,
not including Justice Kennedy but carrying his support in certain statements.
121. Id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(alteration in original) (quoting id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
122. Id. at 536.
123. Id.
124. See Levin, supra note 108, at 564 (identifying that the opinions are the same
“up to a point”).
125. Fox, 556 U.S. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
126. Id. at 515 (majority opinion).
127. See id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the
analysis of a policy change does not require a heightened standard (citing id. at 514
(majority opinion))).
128. See id. at 515–16 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is not that further justification is
demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is
needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered
by the prior policy.”); id. at 552–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FCC
acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it failed to consider important aspects of
the problem, including some relied upon in the original policy).
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though an agency’s analysis may have to be more in-depth for policy
changes because the facts and factors to be considered would be
more extensive, the Court recognized that the APA does not treat
initial and subsequent agency actions differently.129
II. FOX OVERRULED ALASKA HUNTERS SUB SILENTIO
Fox overruled Alaska Hunters sub silentio by holding that the APA
does not treat initial and subsequent agency actions differently.130
Though the agency action in question in Fox was an adjudicative
order, not a rule, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer phrased the
entire decision using the broad terms “agency action” and “policy.”131
There is no reason to restrict the Fox holding to adjudications
because the Court’s language addresses all agency activities,
including interpretive rules.132 Applying the holding in Fox to
interpretive rulemaking, the APA should not distinguish initial
agency interpretations of regulations from subsequent interpretations
undoing or revising old interpretations.133 The extension of Fox to
interpretive rulemaking is consistent with the clear language of the
APA, which includes both the issuance and amendment of rules in its
definition of “rulemaking.”134
The Alaska Hunters doctrine establishes different procedural
standards for initial interpretations of regulations and some
subsequent interpretations of regulations.135 According to the
doctrine, initial interpretive rules need not be issued through notice
129. See id. at 515 (majority opinion) (“The [APA] makes no distinction . . .
between initial agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that
action.”); id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that, rather than imposing a
“heightened” standard when changing a policy, the law “requires application of the
same standard of review to different circumstances, namely, circumstances
characterized by the fact that change is at issue”).
130. See id. at 515 (majority opinion); see also Levin, supra note 108, at 573 n.90
(suggesting that Fox may have “ripple effect” implications for the Alaska Hunters
doctrine). Importantly, the Court never considered Alaska Hunters in Fox.
131. E.g., Fox, 556 U.S. at 515; id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 515 (majority opinion); id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. Conn. Nat’l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[P]resume that a legislature says in
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”).
133. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16 (establishing that no further justification is needed
for policy changes but that a reasoned analysis might include additional
considerations for policy changes).
134. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2006) (“‘[R]ule making’ means agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”).
135. See Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033–34 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (holding that once an agency establishes an interpretation of a regulation, any
change to that interpretation must, like a change to the regulation itself, come
through a notice-and-comment process).
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and comment, while certain subsequent interpretive rules require
notice and comment.136 Because the Alaska Hunters doctrine treats
initial and subsequent agency actions differently, it was undermined,
if not overruled, in Fox.
Of course, the Court in Fox also asserts that arbitrary and capricious
review of agency action can, in practice, differ from review of an
initial action because there are inherent substantive differences
between initial and subsequent actions.137 Agencies must analyze all
reasonably considerable facts and factors when establishing policy,
and the nature of those facts and factors differ depending on
whether the action is initial or subsequent.138 Nonetheless, the Court
in Fox held that initial and subsequent actions are reviewed using the
same standard—in that case, arbitrary and capricious review.139 Thus,
application of the APA’s standards may differ based on the
circumstances and context, but the APA’s standards for initial and
subsequent actions do not differ.140 Courts applying the Alaska
Hunters doctrine interpret the APA as treating initial and subsequent
agency
actions—regulatory
interpretations—with
different
procedural standards. The Court rejected that approach in Fox.
Given that the Fox Court rejected the Alaska Hunters approach,
some might argue that agencies will be free to change regulatory
interpretations at will, undermining regulated parties’ abilities to
“know the rules by which the game will be played.”141 However, these
critics could be appeased by applying the Fox Court’s arbitrary and
capricious review to shifting interpretations of regulations.

136. Id.
137. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16 (acknowledging that arbitrary and capricious
analysis of policy changes should include some analysis unique to changes); id. at
552–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
138. See id. at 515 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at 513.
140. See id. at 514–15 (rejecting a per se heightened standard for changing prior
rules but articulating the circumstances in which the APA requires a more searching
analysis for agency action).
141. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035 (citing Holmes, supra note 96, at 414). For
academic support of the Alaska Hunters doctrine, see generally Stephen M. Johnson,
Good Guidance, Good Grief!, 72 MO. L. REV. 695 (2007); Richard W. Murphy, Hunters for
Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917 (2006); and Ryan DeMotte, Note,
Interpretive Rulemaking and the Alaska Hunters Doctrine: A Necessary Limitation on Agency
Discretion, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 357 (2004).
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III. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW, AS REFINED IN FOX, IS A MORE
EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT WAY TO POLICE CHANGES TO REGULATORY
INTERPRETATIONS
Traditionally, the exemption for interpretive rules in the APA,142
and the principle that interpretive rules have no binding effect, gave
agencies discretion to change interpretations of regulations at will.143
Courts used arbitrary and capricious analysis to limit this discretion.144
The D.C. Circuit deviated from this approach with the Alaska Hunters
doctrine, which limits the discretion of agencies by requiring notice
and comment for changes of certain interpretations of regulations.145
In Fox, the Court not only implicitly overruled the Alaska Hunters
doctrine, it also provided a framework that could facilitate a return to
the traditional approach—using arbitrary and capricious review to
limit agency discretion in interpretive rulemaking.
The Alaska Hunters doctrine provides the courts with a shield for
defending against what Professor Robert Anthony has termed
“spurious rules.”146 Spurious rules are interpretive rules, not issued
through notice and comment, that interpret a vaguely written
regulation with little underlying meaning.147
Spurious rules,
Professor Anthony argues, should be considered independently
binding because they provide the specific requirements needed to
give effect to an otherwise vague legislative rule, thereby providing
the appearance of legal force.148 These rules pose a real risk, as many
agencies have developed a practice of issuing intentionally vague
regulations, or regulations identical to a statute, leaving the real
“binding” element up to later agency interpretations.149 By doing
142. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006).
143. See Mark Seidenfeld, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY PRACTICE 1998–1999, at 105, 112 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2000)
(recognizing this traditional principle).
144. Id.
145. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1033–34; supra Part I.C.
146. Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules:
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 10 (1994).
147. Id. at 10–11. Professor Anthony also recognizes policy statements that are not
based on any regulation or legislation as “spurious.” Id. However troubling this
development may be, it is not relevant to this Comment.
148. Id.
149. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(“The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded
statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended
phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency issues
circulars or guidance memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often
expanding the commands in the regulations . . . . Law is made, without notice and
comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations.”). The court in Appalachian Power
believed that it found a spurious rule. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
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this, agencies maintain the flexibility to change a rule, but circumvent
the public’s ability to participate in the rulemaking process.150
The arbitrary and capricious review in Fox can replace the Alaska
Hunters doctrine’s limitation on agency discretion to change
regulatory interpretations by allowing review of each interpretive
adjustment during litigation. Under Fox, a court would require (1)
an adequate explanation of why the agency changed interpretations,
(2) a justification for contradicting or disregarding facts or factors
considered in the previous interpretation, and (3) an indication that
the agency considered reliance interests.151 To withstand judicial
review, agencies would publish limited explanations of changes to
regulatory interpretations, addressing the above three considerations.
These safeguards are more consistent with the APA and Supreme
Court case law than the Alaska Hunters doctrine. Additionally, the
safeguards are more efficient at limiting the typical abuses of
interpretive rulemaking than a notice-and-comment requirement.
A. Fox Is More Consistent with the APA than the Alaska Hunters Doctrine
Unlike the Alaska Hunters doctrine, applying the arbitrary and
capricious review in Fox to agency changes to regulatory
interpretations is consistent with the plain language of the APA.
Section 553(b)(A) exempts interpretive rules from notice-andcomment procedures.152 This exemption should include changes to
interpretive rules because the APA includes amendments to rules in
its “rule making” definition.153 Thus, amendments should be subject
to the same procedures as initial rules, and all interpretive rules,
including amendments, are exempt from notice and comment.

issued a rule through notice and comment that directed state permitting agencies to
condition permits for regulated entities on “periodic monitoring.” Id. at 1018. The
EPA later issued an interpretation of that regulation, asserting that the periodic
monitoring regulation required enough monitoring to ensure compliance with
pollution standards. Id. at 1025. The court set aside the guidance document
because it expanded the monitoring requirement beyond the meaning of the
regulation. Id. at 1028 (citing Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034).
150. See Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that the
main purpose of notice and comment is to ensure public participation after policy
making authority is delegated to unrepresentative agencies).
151. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (explaining the basis of these
three factors).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006).
153. Id. § 551(5); see Pierce, supra note 83, at 567 (arguing that the D.C. Circuit
looked only to § 551(5) and failed to consider the interpretive rule exemption in
§ 553(b)(A)).
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The D.C. Circuit seems to read the APA differently. It considers a
long-standing interpretation to be a part of the regulation itself.154
Thus, amending the interpretation is akin to amending the legislative
rule itself, an act that requires notice and comment under § 553.155
Interpreting the APA to equate an amendment of an interpretive
rule with amending the underlying legislative rule undermines the
distinction between interpretive and legislative rules. By holding that
a regulatory interpretation has become a part of the legislative rule, a
court essentially accepts the interpretation as binding.156 This
fundamentally undermines the distinction between interpretations
and legislative regulations because it acknowledges that
interpretations of regulations can be as binding as legislative
regulations.157
Relative to the shaky statutory foundation of the Alaska Hunters
doctrine, applying the arbitrary and capricious analysis used in Fox to
regulatory interpretations would be statutorily sound. The section of
the APA referring to judicial review, § 706, states that “[t]he
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”158
Congress intended courts to use arbitrary and capricious analysis to
restrict “abuse[s] of discretion.”159 Because interpretive rules are
exempt from notice and comment, interpretations are left to agency
discretion.160 Under § 706, abuse of agency discretion can be held
unlawful if arbitrary and capricious.161
The Fox Court reiterated that when changing policies, agencies
should engage in certain reasoning that would not otherwise be

154. See Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034 (“When an agency has given its regulation
a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the
agency has in effect amended its rule . . . .”); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena
L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the adoption of a new
interpretation of a regulation is akin to amending the regulation); Richard W.
Murphy, Hunters for Administrative Common Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 917, 923 (2006)
(recognizing the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the Alaska Hunters doctrine as
linking a long-standing interpretation to the legislative rule).
155. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
156. See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just
Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 3–11 (1996) (arguing that courts should perform
independent review of agency interpretations because any level of deference has the
effect of making interpretations binding).
157. See Connolly, supra note 18, at 172–74 (asserting that the Alaska Hunters
doctrine erodes the difference between legislative and interpretive rules).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 553(b)(A).
161. Id. § 706(2)(A).
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necessary for initial policy decisions.162 Applying Fox to changes in
regulatory interpretations means review of any change will look to
reliance interests, a description of why the agency changed, and
contradictions with any facts or factors considered in the previous
policy.163 The APA does not preclude consideration of these issues; in
fact, § 706 states that courts should “determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”164 This broad
language, on its face, grants courts wide authority to interpret agency
actions, including regulatory interpretations of the agency
regulations.165 Therefore, though the plain language of the APA
conflicts with the Alaska Hunters doctrine, it does not preclude
arbitrary and capricious review of amendments to interpretations of
regulations.
B. Fox Is More Consistent with Supreme Court Case Law than Alaska
Hunters
The Alaska Hunters doctrine has never been litigated before the
Supreme Court, and Fox carries more authority because it is a
Supreme Court decision. Applying the Fox analysis to interpretive
rulemaking is also more consistent with prior Supreme Court case
law, an indication that the Supreme Court might overrule the Alaska
Hunters doctrine explicitly if given the chance.
The Alaska Hunters doctrine conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Vermont Yankee. In Vermont Yankee, the Court famously
held that the APA provides the maximum level of procedural
requirements that a court can impose on agencies.166 The Court held
that the judiciary cannot overturn a rule because an agency’s
procedures did not “ventilate” the issues; to invalidate a rule based on
procedure, a court must find that the agency did not comply with a
162. E.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)
(establishing that agencies must at least acknowledge the policy change).
163. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (deriving these requirements
from the Fox decisions).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
165. See Anthony, supra note 156, at 9 (arguing that courts should not abdicate
their authority to interpret agency regulations by deferring to agency
interpretations). Despite the Supreme Court’s history of strong deference to agency
decisionmaking, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), even it has acknowledged that courts should usually grant agencies less
deference where, like in interpretive rulemaking, the agency opinion is issued
without notice and comment, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31
(2001).
166. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 523, 544–45 (1978) (holding that a court may only invalidate a rule due to
procedural inadequacies if an agency failed to comport with statutorily established
procedures).
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statutory procedure established in either the APA or a governing
statute.167 Accordingly, a court cannot impose notice-and-comment
procedures when the APA would not require those procedures.168
The Alaska Hunters doctrine requires notice-and-comment
procedures for some interpretive rules—a requirement not found in
the APA.
Arbitrary and capricious review of changing regulatory
interpretations would also establish procedures that the APA does not
explicitly require. The APA does not explicitly require agencies to
include any basis of reasoning or purpose when publishing
interpretive rules.169 If a court applied the arbitrary and capricious
review in Fox to agency interpretations, agencies would have to
provide such a statement of reasoning and purpose alongside the
interpretation to facilitate that review.170 This could be considered an
additional procedure because an agency would be required to
publish more than just the interpretation itself.
The Supreme Court considered this very issue in Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp.171 In LTV Corp., the Court was forced to
reconcile Vermont Yankee with Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,172 which imposed a procedural arbitrary and capricious
requirement that agencies provide an explanation of agency policy
positions before arguing the positions in the courtroom.173 The
Court recognized that requiring an agency to explain its actions at
the proper time in order to facilitate judicial review was an exception
to Vermont Yankee.174
Again, the Fox standard requires an adequate explanation of why
an agency changed policy, a justification for contradicting or
disregarding facts or factors considered in the previous policy, and
consideration of reliance interests.175 Applying these requirements to
changes in regulatory interpretations, an agency would have to
167. Id. at 540–45.
168. Id.; see supra Part III.A (discussing how the Alaska Hunters doctrine is not
explicitly established in the APA).
169. Alternatively, legislative rulemaking requires a “general statement of . . . basis
and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
170. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (establishing that Fox requires
these considerations and explanations).
171. 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
172. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
173. See id. at 419 (prohibiting post hoc courtroom rationalizations and providing
that certain additional explanations can be required to facilitate judicial review).
174. See LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 655 (“[U]nlike in Overton Park, the Court of
Appeals did not suggest that the administrative record was inadequate to enable the
court to fulfill its duties under § 706 [arbitrary and capricious review].”).
175. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (analyzing the Fox opinions).
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include these explanations and analyses with any altered interpretive
rule,176 and thus would require procedures not explicitly included in
the APA.177 However, like LTV Corp., Vermont Yankee would not bar a
court from requiring these explanations because they are intended to
facilitate judicial arbitrary and capricious review.178
C. Arbitrary and Capricious Review Is More Consistent with the New
Approaches for Distinguishing Between Legislative and Interpretive Rules
Arbitrary and capricious review, as opposed to the Alaska Hunters
doctrine, is more likely to survive the Supreme Court’s changing
perspective on the distinction between legislative and interpretive
rules. The arbitrary and capricious analysis espoused in Fox fits with
the evolving perspectives on the distinction between interpretive and
legislative rules. Though the degree of deference owed to regulatory
interpretations is unclear, it is apparent that the Court is now
focusing more on the issue of deference than whether an
interpretation is binding on the public, and thus procedurally
invalid.179 By focusing on substantive arbitrary and capricious review,
a court could look to an agency’s Fox explanations, with whatever
deference is required, to limit an agency’s discretion when changing
regulatory interpretations.180
By bolstering the substantive review of interpretive rules, courts can
avoid the nebulous analysis of what is and is not a legislative rule;
courts could simply establish that rules issued through notice and
comment enjoy the deference granted to legislative rules, and that
rules issued without notice and comment are granted the lesser

176. See supra Part II (asserting that applying these requirements to interpretive
rulemaking is reasonable because the Fox Court referred to “agency action” and the
arbitrary and capricious standard applies to all agency actions, including interpretive
rulemaking).
177. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (including no procedural requirements for
interpretive rules).
178. See LTV Corp., 496 U.S. at 654–55 (concluding that the arbitrary and
capricious standard imposes a procedural requirement that agencies take whatever
steps necessary to enable a court to evaluate the agency’s rationale).
179. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (analyzing an
interpretive rule using a deference analysis instead of analyzing whether it was
binding on the public). Again, legislative rules that are binding on the public must
go through notice and comment, and inversely, interpretive rules that do not go
through notice and comment are not binding. See supra notes 42–45 and
accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 125–26 (establishing that Fox arbitrary and capricious review
requires an agency to explain why it changed interpretations, justify contradicting
facts or factors considered in the previous interpretation, and consider reliance
interests).
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deference given to interpretive rules.181 In essence, the process that
an agency uses to issue a rule is less important as long as the decision
is made after considering all of the issues and coming to a reasonable
decision.
Professor Mark Seidenfeld recently argued for this
approach, advocating for a “reasoned decisionmaking” review.182 The
Fox analysis can provide a version of reasoned decisionmaking review
by requiring explanations of agency changes after review of all of the
issues.
The Alaska Hunters doctrine has no place in this new regime, which
defines a rule by its procedure, not by its effect. In the new regime,
amending a regulatory interpretation without notice and comment
would place the action within the exemption in § 553; the
interpretation could not be considered a part of the regulation
because the lack of notice and comment would make it an
interpretive rule.183 Additionally, defining an interpretive rule by its
non-binding effect creates challenges because many regulatory
interpretations are granted the higher Auer deference, establishing
the highest level of deference and therefore increasing the likelihood
that the interpretation will be upheld.184
D. The Benefits of Using Substantive Review To Manage Agency Use of
Guidance Documents in General
Professor Seidenfeld argues for the use of a reasoned analysis
review at the time a guidance document is issued.185 This approach
would circumvent any doctrinal confusion over what is binding or
which level of deference is appropriate, and would ideally replace
many procedural restrictions.186 By focusing solely on the substance
of guidance documents, courts can properly restrict an agency’s
abuse of these documents, without decreasing efficiency via a
protracted process.187 The Fox decision provides a framework for

181. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 373–75 (arguing that substantive analysis can
replace procedural review while providing a proper balance between the necessity of
guidance documents and the necessity of restraining agency autonomy in issuing
guidance documents).
182. Id. at 374.
183. See supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text (describing the short-cut
approach).
184. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 73,
at 1142 tbl.15 (finding that courts uphold an agency interpretation under Auer
deference 91% of the time).
185. Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 373.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 373–75.

SHEARER.OFF_TO_PRINTER_REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

194

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/23/2012 1:00 PM

[Vol. 62:167

substantive review that can be used to implement Professor
Seidenfeld’s suggestions.188
The doctrines of finality and ripeness, however, obstruct the full
implementation of this approach because they could impede the
immediate review of guidance documents.189 Some courts have
concluded that a regulatory interpretation is not final and thus
cannot be reviewed.190 Other courts have held that a regulatory
interpretation’s lack of independent binding force exempts the
interpretation from the general assumption of pre-enforcement
ripeness.191 Neither of these obstacles should exist in a legal
landscape that ties the appropriate level of deference to the binding
nature of a rule.
The appropriate level of deference could be determined at the
time a rule is issued because the degree of deference is determined
by an analysis of factors or events that occur before enforcement.192
The probability that a rule will be upheld in court should be
proportional to the degree of deference it is afforded.193 Because a
188. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (analyzing the distinct factors
considered in the various Fox opinions).
189. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 375–85 (acknowledging that some courts
have refused to review agency interpretations before an enforcement action due to
ripeness and finality, but providing examples where courts reviewed interpretations
pre-enforcement). The doctrine of finality generally requires agency action to be at
its final stage before a court may review it. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78
(1997) (stating that agency action is only judicially reviewable if it is a consummation
of the agency’s process, and if legal consequences will follow the agency
determination). Furthermore, claims challenging agency action must be ripe. See
Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998) (holding that an
interpretive rule was not ripe because it did not impose immediate legal effects on
the litigant due to the non-binding nature of legislative rules).
190. See, e.g., Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2004)
(describing a tentative agency letter as not final); Taylor-Callahan-Coleman Cntys.
Dist. Adult Prob. Dep’t v. Dole, 948 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that an
advisory interpretation was not final because it was subject to change). But see
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a
guidance document was final because it changed binding norms); Venetian Casino
Resort, L.L.C. v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 931 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (concluding that a
guidance document amounted to final action).
191. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1967) (adopting a
pragmatic approach that assumes pre-enforcement ripeness). But see Seidenfeld,
supra note 41, at 381 n.267 (providing cases that imply no pre-enforcement ripeness
of guidance documents).
192. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171–73 (2007)
(effect on rights and notice and comment); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257
(2006) (specificity of the interpretation); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222
(2002) (adequacy of the interpretive method).
193. In theory, the probability that a rule will be upheld in court should be tied to
the deference it is afforded. Studies indicate, however, that deference has little effect
on whether a rule will be upheld, unless it is afforded Auer deference, which is
associated with the highest probability that a rule will be upheld. Eskridge & Baer,
supra note 73, at 1142 tbl.15 (reporting that agency action is upheld 70% of the time
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challenged rule is only truly binding on the public when a court is
bound to apply the rule to the public, the level of deference a court
gives an agency’s guidance document is directly related to the
document’s binding effect on the public.194 In other words, when a
court grants deference to a guidance document, it gives the
document a level of binding force—undermining the justification for
avoiding pre-enforcement review of guidance documents due to
ripeness.195 Additionally, to hold that a guidance document cannot
be challenged because it may not be applied to regulated parties is
illogical; the very existence of a guidance document implies that an
agency is at least planning to follow it. Of course, agencies have
prosecutorial discretion to apply an interpretation to a specific party,
but considering that agencies have that same discretion when it
comes to all interpretive rules, legislative rules, and even statutes, this
is no basis for establishing differing finality or ripeness standards for
guidance documents.
Ripeness and finality issues aside, the Fox standard for arbitrary and
capricious review can provide a reasoned analysis that can replace
procedural objections to guidance documents. The Supreme Court
in Fox established a viable framework for substantive review by
requiring an agency to explain why it changed interpretation, refute
conflicting facts and factors used in the initial interpretation, and
address reliance interests implicated by the change.196 In focusing on
these three factors, the Fox standard requires an agency to sufficiently
build the record to verify that it conducted a reasoned analysis.197
E. The Problems with Compulsory Notice and Comment Under Alaska
Hunters
There is some limited evidence suggesting that compulsory notice
and comment does not affect the resulting policy in a rule. Assuming

under all but Auer deference, and that agency action is upheld 90% of the time
under Auer deference). Thus, if a regulatory interpretation is granted Skidmore
deference, it will have the same probability of being upheld as a legislative rule, and
if a regulatory interpretation is granted Auer deference, it will actually have a higher
probability of being upheld.
194. Furthermore, some courts have begun discussing interpretive rules as
binding on the court. Supra note 80.
195. Anthony, supra note 156, at 3–11 (arguing that courts should grant
independent review of agency interpretations because deference creates a binding
effect).
196. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing the factors
analyzed in Fox review).
197. See Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 385 (arguing that arbitrary and capricious
analysis should build the record for reasoned analysis).
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this is true, the government burden of compulsory notice and
comment could outweigh its benefits.
At least one empirical study suggests that notice and comment is
either minimally effective at limiting an agency’s discretion or
redundant,198 making the Alaska Hunters doctrine either ineffective or
unnecessary. In a two-month study of federal regulations issued
through notice and comment, Professor Stuart Shapiro found that
72% of rules issued through notice and comment were substantively
unchanged by the process.199 This means that of all federal agency
actions carried out with notice-and-comment procedures, agencies
only substantially changed the final rule after receiving comments
28% of the time, implying that notice and comment rarely leads to a
change in policy.200 A more pertinent study to the Alaska Hunters
doctrine would focus on whether agencies change final rules after
receiving comments when the notice-and-comment procedure was
court ordered. Presumably, when an agency voluntarily opts to send
a rule through notice and comment when it is not required by the
APA,201 the agency would be more open to adopting public
comments. When an agency sends a rule through notice and
comment after having already attempted to avoid the procedure, it is
probable that the agency would be less open to adopting comments,
decreasing the chance that the procedure will further change
policy.202
Of course, limiting an agency’s discretion is not the only purpose
of notice and comment. Notice and comment provides notice to the
public of proposed rules and creates a record for subsequent judicial
challenge.203 It also ensures that the public has a chance to
participate in the rulemaking process.204
198. Stuart Shapiro, Two Months in the Life of the Regulatory State, ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Spring 2005, at 12, 14 & tbl.4.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. E.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 35,102, 35,107 (proposed June 20, 2008) (to be codified at
20 C.F.R. pt. 501) (acknowledging that the Department of Labor voluntarily
provided the notice-and-comment opportunity despite the fact that the proposed
changes were exempt from the APA). This notice is one of many examples where an
agency voluntarily posted a notice for comment to obtain information from the
public.
202. A comparable empirical study suggests that when a rule is remanded, it does
not typically stop the agency from eventually achieving its regulatory goals. Jordan,
supra note 11, at 413, 414 & tbl.2.
203. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996)
(establishing that notice and comment is intended to allow the marshalling of
opposition to a rule and provide a long record for judicial review).
204. See Johnson, supra note 141, at 735 (arguing for more public involvement in
agency guidance).
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Arbitrary and capricious review under Fox can also provide these
valuable benefits. The requirements and explanations necessary to
comply with the Fox standard would develop the administrative
record. Additionally, the public can participate in litigation where
courts use the arbitrary and capricious standard to review altered
interpretations.205 As for notifying the public of proposed policy
changes, the thirty-day notice provided by notice and comment is
probably not worth the increased government burden of undergoing
the procedure.206
Compulsory notice and comment is also ineffective because an
agency can adopt an invalidated interpretation during adjudicatory
proceedings.207 If a court invalidates an interpretative rule because it
was not issued through notice and comment, the agency can adopt
that interpretation during adjudication.208 To give substantive effect
to the procedural violation, a court would then have to invalidate the
regulatory interpretation independent of the interpretive rule.209
The deference granted to an interpretation of a regulation
provided by an agency during litigation should be similar to that
granted to a regulatory interpretation issued without notice and
comment. If the Skidmore deference granted to interpretive rules is
truly limited to the rule’s power to persuade,210 then it is not much
different than the deference the court grants to any attorney; if a
court is persuaded by an attorney, it will rule in that attorney’s favor.
Just as courts will not defer to an agency’s “unsupported” position in
205. Public participation through litigation is enhanced by the general
assumption that litigants have pre-enforcement standing. See Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–50 (1967) (providing a two-fold analysis for standing that
favors pre-enforcement by looking to fitness of the issue for judicial decision and
hardship to parties).
206. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2006) (requiring agencies to issue final rules thirty
days before the effective date).
207. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 90 (1995) (concluding that
an interpretive rule that might have otherwise been procedurally invalid was valid
because the guidance document espoused an interpretation that the court would
have independently upheld); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 774–75
(1969) (Black, J., concurring) (contending that the procedural invalidity of a rule
did not bar application of the interpretation to the defendants in litigation);
Seidenfeld, supra note 41, at 361–63 & n.160 (arguing that the preceding two cases
establish that agencies can freely pursue interpretations through rulemaking or
adjudication).
208. See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 90; Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 774–75
(Black, J., concurring).
209. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 101–02 (upholding the litigation position
after invalidating the identical interpretive rule); Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 774–75
(Black, J., concurring) (same).
210. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Regulatory
interpretations are given the greater Auer deference when the interpretation is less
spurious. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006).
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litigation,211 neither should courts grant significant deference to an
agency’s interpretive rule.212 Empirical evidence suggests that courts
in fact do not provide differing levels of deference to cases
warranting Skidmore deference and cases that the courts review de
novo.213 Therefore, there is little doctrinal difference between the
review of an interpretive rule and an interpretation advanced as a
position in litigation.
Though a court may preclude the retroactive application of a
position in litigation that contradicts prior regulatory
interpretations,214 this preclusion will not deter agencies from
pursuing new positions in litigation. Even if a court rules that an
agency’s position in litigation cannot retroactively apply to the
defendant, the position can be applied to subsequent defendants as
precedent.215 Therefore, an agency would have little incentive to repromulgate an invalidated interpretive rule through notice and
comment because successful litigation of that interpretation could
accomplish the same goal by establishing precedent.216
Given that notice and comment is relatively ineffective at
restricting an agency’s discretion when changing regulatory
interpretations, the Alaska Hunters doctrine’s net effect is regulatory
delay. The benefits of efficient governance outweigh the benefits of
the Alaska Hunters doctrine.217 Using arbitrary and capricious review
211. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (holding that
the courts should not apply Chevron deference to an agency position in litigation that
is unsupported by interpretations or regulations). Bowen leaves open the possibility
of applying the lower Skidmore deference to agency positions in litigation. Also, a
substantively valid position may receive deference under the Bowen framework
because it would be supported by the underlying regulation. Id.
212. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (establishing
that the lower Skidmore deference, which requires an agency’s interpretation to be
persuasive, is granted to interpretive rules).
213. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 73, at 1142 tbl.15 (concluding that courts
uphold agency action around 70% of the time no matter whether the court applied
Chevron, Skidmore, State Farm, or de novo deference). This study supports the
assertion that deference given to interpretive rules and interpretations asserted
during litigation is the same.
214. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294–95 (1974) (holding
that an agency could change a long-standing interpretation through adjudication,
but that a new interpretation could not be retroactively applied to impose a
substantial penalty); see also Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 269 F.3d 1098, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (applying a new interpretation issued during adjudication retroactively
because the new interpretation is a new application of existing law, not a change in
the law).
215. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 774–75 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring) (applying a litigation position to a defendant as precedent that, due to
retroactivity, was not applied when the precedent was set).
216. Id.
217. See DeMotte, supra note 141, at 361–62 (arguing that the benefit of the Alaska
Hunters doctrine is its ability to restrain discretion).
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to limit an agency’s discretion to change its interpretations of
regulations imposes a substantive limitation on agency discretion
without delaying agency action.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on agency rulemaking is a
confusing maze of contradicting definitions, levels of deference, and
standards of review. Unfortunately, the Alaska Hunters doctrine
added to this confusion by making the procedure for changing
regulatory interpretations unclear to both agencies and regulated
parties. Differing circuit doctrines on how regulatory interpretations
can be issued further clog an administrative system that implements
regulations on a national level. Thankfully, the Supreme Court
cleared up some of the confusion by overruling the Alaska Hunters
doctrine sub silentio in Fox, bringing the nation closer to establishing a
consistent and straight-forward procedure for issuing and amending
interpretations of regulations.
Applying the arbitrary and capricious review in Fox to interpretive
rulemaking is more consistent with the APA, more consistent with the
Supreme Court’s nebulous case law, and more efficient than the
Alaska Hunters doctrine. The Supreme Court took the first of many
necessary steps toward alleviating ossification of agency rulemaking
by overruling Alaska Hunters sub silentio. The next step should be to
simplify its own precedent on the binding effect of, and deference
granted to, interpretive and legislative rules. A simple regime of
heightened deference (or binding effect) for rules issued through
notice and comment, and the arbitrary and capricious review
prescribed in Fox, would provide a much more manageable legal
landscape. Where an agency deviates from a past interpretation
without notice and comment, arbitrary and capricious review could
be facilitated by requiring an agency to issue the new interpretation
with explanations on why it changed interpretations, why
contradicting facts or factors were disregarded, and how reliance
interests were considered. The benefits of a less ossified rulemaking
landscape using the Fox analysis would outweigh the minimal benefits
of compulsory notice and comment under the Alaska Hunters
doctrine.

